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11.1 Introduction
Most empirical models of company investment rely on the assumption of
perfect capital markets. One implication of this assumption is that, in a world
without taxes, firms are indifferent to funding their investment programs from
internal or external funds. However, there is a rapidly growing body of litera-
ture examining the possible existence of imperfections in capital markets and
their effects on firms' financial and real decisions. In this paper we provide
some econometric evidence on the impact of financial factors like cash flow,
debt, and stock measures of liquidity on the investment decisions of U.K.
firms. These variables are introduced via an extension of the Q model of in-
vestment, which explicitly includes agency costs. We discuss whether the sig-
nificance of cash flow is due to the fact that it proxies for output or because it
is a better measure of market fundamentals than Q. Moreover, we investigate
if the effect of financial factors varies across different types of firm. The cross-
sectional variation of the impact on investment of flow and stock measures of
liquidity has been analyzed also by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)
and by Gertler and Hubbard (1988) for U.S. firms and by Hoshi, Kashyap,
and Scharfstein (1988) for Japanese firms. The former studies distinguish be-
tween firms according to their dividend payment behavior, while the latter
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classifies firms according to the strength of their institutional relationships
with banks. Instead, we group observations according to firm size, age, and
type of industry (growing and declining). The empirical importance of this
breakdown is a natural subject of investigation and moreover allows us to
minimize the problems of endogenous selection. In the theoretical section we
outline a simple model that illustrates how cash flow can be introduced in Q
models. We discuss the determinants of the size of the cash-flow effect and
explain why caution must be exercised in attributing interfirm differences only
to differences in the importance of agency or financial distress costs.
In Section 11.2 we briefly review recent contributions to the literature on
credit market imperfections, and in Section 11.3 we show how features ap-
pearing in these models might be expected to influence investment decisions.
Section 11.4 develops a simple extension of the investment model with ad-
justment costs that explicitly allows for agency costs of external finance. Sec-
tion 11.5 describes the behavior and performance of a sample of 720 manufac-
turing firms in the United Kingdom, split by size and age, and Section 11.6
presents some econometric results, obtained using instrumental variables,
which indicate that financial factors, principally in the form of lagged cash
flow, do have an independent effect on investment. Section 11.7 is a brief
conclusion.
11.2 The Cost of External Finance
During the last few years there has been a renewed interest in understanding
the relationship between investment and financing decisions, at both the theo-
retical and empirical levels. The common theme underlying the various con-
tributions is the lack of perfect substitutability between inside and outside
financing. The existence of differential information and incentive problems
makes external finance more costly than internal finance. In this setting the
availability of internally generated funds, and/or of assets that can be used as
collateral, may have an effect on investment decisions.
Let us briefly review the disadvantages and benefits of external finance.
Starting with debt finance, there are different reasons why there may be a
conflict between shareholders and debtholders, giving rise to agency costs of
debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that stockholders will have an in-
centive to engage in projects that are too risky and so increase the possibility
of financial distress and bankruptcy. If successful, the payoff to the owners of
the firm is large. If unsuccessful, the limited liability provision of debt con-
tracts implies that the creditors bear most of the cost. Myers (1977) suggests
that if the firm is partly debt financed, it may underinvest in the sense that it
forgoes projects with a positive net present value. This problem is particularly
severe when assets in place are a small proportion of the total value of the
firm. Other areas of conflict between bondholders and shareholders are repre-
sented by the claim dilution resulting from the issue of additional debt and by281 Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow
the possibility that the firm may pay out excessive dividends financed by re-
duced investment.
Since potential creditors are assumed to understand the incentives facing
stockholders and are aware of the risk of bankruptcy when loans are negoti-
ated, the owner will ultimately bear the consequences of these agency prob-
lems in terms of a higher cost of debt. With asymmetric information about
borrower quality, rationing may also occur (see Jaffee and Russell 1976; Stig-
litz and Weiss 1981). As a way to control the conflict between bondholders
and shareholders and to minimize the agency cost of debt, bond covenants are
observed, limiting the discretionary action of the owners regarding dividends,
future debt issues, and maintenance of working capital (Smith and Warner
1979). Debt covenants usually contain a maximum limit on the amount of
dividends that can be paid out that depends positively upon accumulated earn-
ings. Restrictions on the minimum value of the ratio between tangible assets
and debt, working capital and debt and, finally, between interest payments and
cash flow are also common. The greater is the amount of debt in the firm's
capital structure, the more severe the incentive problems become, and the
more likely it is that the firm will face financial distress and ultimately bank-
ruptcy. Because of the less favorable terms on which debt can be obtained and
because of the cost associated with tighter monitoring and bonding activities,
agency costs are therefore likely to be increasing in the level of debt. On the
other hand, it is likely that such costs are a decreasing function of the level of
past and present earnings and of assets, particularly if liquid in nature, that
can be used as collateral.
While agency costs make debt less attractive, the tax deductibility of inter-
est payments makes it more attractive. In the absence of such costs, debt is
preferred to retentions if (1 — m)/( 1 — z) > 1 — r, where m is the marginal
personal tax rate on interest income, z the tax rate on capital gains, and r the
corporate tax rate (King 1977). In the United Kingdom this inequality is sat-
isfied for most investors.
1
New share issues may be disadvantageous because of transaction costs, tax
reasons, or asymmetric information. Informal evidence on transaction costs
in the United Kingdom suggests that there are large fixed costs in issuing new
equity.
2 The tax disadvantage of new share issues relative to retentions in a
classical system of company taxation depends upon the relationship between
personal tax rates on dividends, m, and capital gains, z. If m is greater than z,
as is usually the case, new equity issues are relatively more expensive (see,
e.g., King 1977). In an imputation system, like the one in existence in the
United Kingdom since 1973, the situation is more complex. New share is-
sues are a cheaper source of finance for a full tax paying firm if (1 - m)l
[(1 - z)(l - c)] > 1, where c is the rate of imputation. This condition will
be satisfied for institutional investors for whom m = z = 0 and for other
investors with a low marginal tax rate on dividends.
3
Finally, new share issues may be more costly because of asymmetric infor-282 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
mation. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that, if managers have inside infor-
mation, it may happen that that information is so favorable that management,
acting in the interest of old shareholders, will not issue new shares, which are
perceived as being underpriced. Investors will therefore interpret the decision
to issue new shares as a bad signal. In this case, new equity finance can only
be obtained at a premium because of the adverse selection problem.
Up to this point in the discussion we have implicitly assumed that manage-
ment acts in the interest of shareholders. Allowing for the possible divergence
of interest between managers and outside shareholders provides an additional
rationale for the disadvantage of external finance. If managers have a less than
100% ownership stake in the company, they will be encouraged to use a
greater than optimal amount of the firm's resources in the form of perquisites
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Such activities can be monitored by the outside
shareholders, but such monitoring is costly, and the insiders will ultimately
bear the cost in terms of a reduced price that prospective outside shareholders
are willing to pay for a stake in the firm. This consideration suggests that the
cost of outside financing is related to the stake of insiders and to the dispersion
of outside ownership.
11.3 Financial Factors and Investment Decisions
What is the effect of credit availability, cash flow, and collateralizable assets
on investment decisions? The literature on this issue has been conducted in
the context of models with different structures concerning information and
technology. One group of papers adds financial considerations to standard in-
vestment models based on the assumption of convex adjustment costs, usually
estimated in their Q form. For example, credit rationing with an exogenously
given ceiling can be easily added to Q models. If there are tax advantages to
debt, firms will borrow up to capacity. Under the standard assumptions (per-
fect competition, constant returns to scale, a single quasi-fixed factor), mar-
ginal Q will continue to equal average Q, with the caveat that the present value
of the interest payments net of new debt issued should be added to the market
value of shares in defining average Q. The present value of these flows can be
approximated by the current value of the stock of debt. One could also assume
that the maximum amount of debt is a fixed proportion of the capital stock
(Summers 1981) with basically the same result.
Alternatively one could include in the objective function an additional cost
term, increasing in the level of debt, that summarizes the agency/financial
distress cost of debt, as in Chirinko (1987).
4 In this case, an internal solution
for debt can be obtained. If the agency cost of debt is linear homogeneous in
its arguments, and the change (as opposed to the level) of debt does not enter
the agency cost function, marginal Q again equals average Q. If the change in
debt does appear in the agency cost function and the latter is not linear homo-283 Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow
geneous, the difference between marginal and average Q depends upon the
present and future values of the change and level of debt (Chirinko 1987).
When personal taxation is taken into account, and if capital gains are taxed
less heavily than dividends, one can distinguish between three financing re-
gimes.
5 In regime 1, investment can be financed at the margin by retentions,
positive dividends are paid, and no new shares are issued. In regime 3, the
firm issues new shares and pays no dividend. In the intermediate case, regime
2, both dividends and new share issues are zero and the marginal source of
finance is debt. A relationship between investment and tax-adjusted average
Q can be derived only in regimes 1 and 3. In regime 2 no such relationship
exists, and investment equals cash flow plus new debt issued. In this context,
an increase in cash flow makes the probability that investment is financed at
the margin by retentions more likely, and this can be shown to increase invest-
ment (Hayashi 1985). However, conditional on Q, cash flow does not have an
additional explanatory power in regimes 1 and 3. In regime 2, increases in
cash flow (and debt) translate into a one-to-one increase in investment and Q
does not matter.
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) extend Q models by including a
premium for issuing new shares, based on the adverse selection argument put
forward by Myers and Majluf (1984). The existence of this premium increases
the cost differential between internal finance and new equity, and it increases
the likelihood that the firm will find itself at the point of discontinuity where
all profits are retained, no dividends are paid, and the firm's future prospects
are not good enough to induce it to issue new shares. For those firms Q does
not matter, while cash flow does matter.
In another group of papers the role and consequences for investment of
informational imperfections are more closely analyzed. In this context the
amount of net assets that can be used as collateral is a determinant of the
agency cost of external finance and has an effect on investment. The particular
informational asymmetry and the details about technology differ across pa-
pers, but the common theme is that insiders have less incentive to cheat and
more incentive to act in the interest of outside investors when their stake in
the project is greater (see the contributions by Bernanke and Gertler 1989;
Gertler 1988; and Gertler and Hubbard 1988). The link between the firm's
value and the fraction of entrepreneur wealth invested in the project is also
emphasised by Leland and Pyle (1977). Since the borrower's net worth is
likely to be procyclical, incentive problems may be particularly severe in a
recession. This may lead to an asymmetric effect of financial variables on
investment during the business cycle.
The existence of informational asymmetries that restrict the firm's ability to
raise external equity plays a crucial role also in the paper by Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1988). They show that production and investment depend upon the
equity position. Since there is only limited access to equity markets, the main284 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
way to change firms' equity is to accumulate cash flow, net of financial obli-
gations. All these models imply that an increase in collateralizable net worth
may stimulate investment. The more precise modeling of the informational
asymmetries and of the possibility of bankruptcy is clearly a strength of these
models. However, they do not yield an investment equation that explains how
financial factors and expectations about firms' prospects jointly determine in-
vestment.
11.4 From Theory to Testing
The empirical importance of financial variables, in particular cash flow and
stock measures of liquid assets, characterizes many econometric studies of
investment based on firm-by-firm data (see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
1988, and Gertler and Hubbard 1988 for the United States; Hayashi and Inoue
1988, and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1988 for Japan; and Blundell et
al. 1989 for the United Kingdom). Most of the testing has been conducted in
the context of Q models in which average Q is used to control for the invest-
ment opportunities open to firms. Fazzari et al. and Gertler and Hubbard ana-
lyze the cross-sectional variation in the importance of financial factors by clas-
sifying firms according to their dividend payout behavior, while Hoshi et al.
make a distinction between firms with and without strong links with a single
bank.
We discuss the role of financial factors in the context of a simple variant of
a Q model of investment. The model includes on the cost side a term, A,
representing agency/financial distress costs which is a function of the stock of
debt B, the capital stock K, the stock of liquid assets L, and cash flow X. Debt
and liquid assets are chosen endogenously, together with investment and new
share issues. On the basis of the arguments of the previous section, agency
costs are an increasing function of debt and a decreasing function of cash flow
and of liquid assets. The agency cost function is expected to vary for firms in
different age and size classes and in different industries. The reasons why this
may be the case are summarized in Section 11.5. Moreover there is a premium
that must be paid for issuing new shares. This way of summarizing informa-
tional asymmetries and the risk of bankruptcy is obviously ad hoc. It is
adopted here to provide some unifying principle to our discussion and to our
empirical testing and to make clear the implicit assumptions underlying the
type of equations that have been used so far to test for the importance of
financial factors in equations containing average Q. In particular, we want to
specify a model that is consistent with the fact that cash flow may matter
(albeit differently) for all firms, and not only for those that have used up all
retentions and are not issuing any new shares. Under the assumption of perfect
competition and linear homogeneity of the production, adjustment, and
agency cost functions, the marginal condition for investment, /, implies that
when positive dividends are paid (see Appendix),285 Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow
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where Ax denotes the partial derivative of the agency cost function with re-
spect to cash flow, Xf is the marginal shadow value of capital, p
yt the output
price, pt the investment price, all in period t, b is a parameter from the adjust-
ment cost function (defined in the Appendix), T the corporate tax rate, and 7
the tax discrimination parameter between dividends and retentions equal to
(1 — m)/[(l — z)(l — c)]. The linear homogeneity assumption, although not
necessarily realistic, allows one to show that the following relationship holds
between the marginal and average values of the capital stock:
(2) Xf*,-,(1 - 8) + Xf
where Vt is the market value of the firm's shares at the beginning of period t,
R is the market return on equity, 8 is the depreciation rate, and the X's are the
shadow values of the state variables. If the firm is on its optimal path, it is
possible to show that Xf = -(7 + |xf)[l + R/(l - z)] where (xf is the
multiplier on the nonnegativity condition for dividends. Similarly, Xf =
(7 + (xf)[l + R/(l — z)]. If positive dividends are paid, as is almost always
the case in our sample, the multiplier, (xf, is zero. Using this result in (2) and
taking a first-order approximation of (1) around sample averages or steady
state values we can write:
//\
(3) — = Po + Pi<2 +
\Kjt
where UK denotes investment expenditures and
(Vt/y + Bt - 1 ( ^)
(4) O =
' (1
The coefficients, denoting sample averages or steady state values by bars, are:
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where subscripts again denote partial derivatives.
This equation suggests that the coefficient in front of average Q reflects both
the adjustment cost parameter b and the derivative of the agency cost function
with respect to cash flow. The coefficient of cash flow is positive if AXXIK >
0, as is reasonable to assume (i.e., increasing cash flow reduces agency costs
at a decreasing rate). The coefficient increases with the average investment
rate. It also depends upon average cash flow/capital, debt/capital, liquid as-286 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
sets/capital. Similar comments apply to the coefficients of BIK and LIK, the
signs of which depend on the cross partial derivatives of A. If the agency cost
function is additively separable in the pairs (X,K), (B,K), and (L,K), the last
two regressors can be omitted and the coefficient of XIK depends only upon
the average cash flow to capital ratio (in addition to the investment rate). Un-
less more specific assumptions are made about the functional form of A, little
can be said a priori on its effect on the size of the coefficient, and this is a
source of ambiguity in forecasting the expected strength of the effect of cash
flow, debt, and liquid assets on investment for different types of firms. Aside
from this ambiguity, we allow the agency cost function to be displaced upward
or downward by a multiplicative constant that is specific for each group of
firms and therefore varies according to size, age, and sector. An increase in
the constant unambiguously increases the coefficients of cash flow, debt, and
liquid assets.
There are several reasons why the agency cost function may vary across
firms. First, it might be expected that young and small firms may be at a
disadvantage, ceteris paribus, when raising external finance. Younger firms
are likely to be a riskier prospect since the shorter track record makes it more
difficult to judge their quality. Moreover smaller firms often tend to be less
diversified, to display greater earnings volatility, and to be more prone to
bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels 1988). However, there are also reasons why
it might be the case that incentive problems are more severe for firms in which
insiders own a smaller proportion of the firm and outside ownership is more
dispersed. Since size may proxy for ownership structure, there is some ambi-
guity in assessing the effect of size on agency cost. Finally, it is intuitively
more probable that firms in declining sectors may face financial distress. The
second-hand market for capital goods is likely to be less active, the liquidation
value of assets to be smaller, and, therefore, the cost of financial trouble
greater in this case.
We have assumed so far that positive dividends are being paid because this
is what our data suggests happens most of the time. In this case the first-order
condition on new share issues implies that 7— 1— a), + |xf = 0, where co,
is the marginal adverse selection premium firms have to pay when issuing new
shares, and |xf is the nonnegativity constraint on new equity issues. If co, is
independent of Vf as in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), then we need
to assume that 7 is less than 1 + wf, otherwise it would pay to finance contin-
uous new dividend distributions by issuing new shares. If the above condition
holds, firms will not issue new shares and pay dividends at the same time. In
order to provide a satisfactory rationale for an internal solution for dividends
and new share issues, it would be necessary to provide an analysis of the
signaling role of dividends and of the possibility of tax exhaustion, but this
goes beyond the purpose of this paper. The specification of Q models when
the various asymmetries of the tax schedule are explicitly modeled is con-
tained in Devereux, Keen, and Schiantarelli (1989), where it is shown that an
internal solution for dividends and new share issues can be obtained because287 Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow
the possibility of tax exhaustion reduces the effective value of 7. Alternatively,
it must be assumed that personal tax rates vary across investors and that the
condition 7=1+0), determines the marginal investor in the case of an
internal solution.
11.5 Interfirm Differences in Financing, Investment and Profitability
in the United Kingdom
In this section we discuss how financing, investment, profitability, and
other characteristics vary across different types of firms according to size, age,
and sector. The results presented here are based on a sample of 720 firms in
the U.K. manufacturing sector over the period 1969-86, quoted on the Lon-
don Stock Exchange. Because of births and deaths and an increase in the
number of firms available in 1975, the number of records on each firm varies
between 4 and 18; only 89 firms existed for the entire sample period. Data
have been obtained from two sources. Accounting data on each firm has been
provided by Datastream, and market valuations have been taken from the Lon-
don Share Price Database (LSPD). These two sources have been merged for
each firm in each year to provide the data used in this paper.
6 These firms
account for approximately 65% of total investment in manufacturing between
1977 and 1985. The construction of the variables follows that in Blundell et
al. (1989). Company investment includes direct purchase of new fixed as-
sets and those acquired through acquisitions. The firm's market value is an av-
erage for the three months prior to each accounting year. Replacement cost
estimates of the capital stock are estimated using the perpetual inventory
method.
7
The discussion above implied that there are several reasons why one might
expect the location of the agency cost function to differ across firms. Given its
location, the expectation of the relative effect of financial factors on invest-
ment would also depend on their relative investment rates and their cash flow,
debt, and other liquid assets relative to their capital stock. In this section we
present some evidence on the relative sizes of these ratios and more generally
on firms' characteristics according to size, age, and whether they operate in a
growing or declining sector.
It is also worth commenting briefly on the difference between these splits
(by size, age, and sector) and that used by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988). Fazzari et al. split their sample of firms according to their dividend
payout ratios. This was an attempt to identify those firms that were likely to
pay no dividends and at the same time did not find it profitable to issue new
shares. In the United States, this may be reasonable (Fazzari et al. show that,
among their group of firms having a low payout rate, dividends are paid only
33% of the time). However, in the United Kingdom, the vast majority of firms
pay dividends every year while some firms also raise external equity finance
fairly frequently. Without explicitly modeling why firms pay dividends—for
example, because of a possible signaling role (see, e.g., John and Williams288 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
1985; Ambarish, John, and Williams 1987; and Edwards 1987 for a critical
discussion)—it is not clear which firms are constrained by their earnings and
which are not. For example, if cutting dividends is taken to be a negative
signal, firms that have paid high dividends in the past will be forced to main-
tain a high dividend strategy. Alternatively, following Easterbrook (1984) and
Rozeff (1982), it might be argued that firms with a more widespread owner-
ship are required to pay a higher dividend because this implicitly forces them
to submit to scrutiny from the market when they raise external funds.
In table 11.1 we present some summary statistics in which each observation
on each firm is classified into one of three size categories according to the real
value of the capital stock (1980 prices) at the beginning of the preceding pe-
riod (pKt _ 2). The observation is classified as small if pKt _ 2 is less than £6
million, medium if pKt _ 2 is between £6 million and £50 million, and large if
pKt _ 2 is above £50 million. Note that, as a firm grows, it may move from one
Table 11.1 Split by Size
Case 1 pK,_2 < £6m
Case 2 £6m < pK,_2 < £50m












Change in long-term debt/total funds
Change in short-term debt/total funds
Change in bank debt/total funds
Long-term debt/market value
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"Total funds are the sum of retentions, new equity, and the change in long-term and short-term
debt.
•"Market value is taken as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.
'Current assets comprise inventories and work in progress, financial investments, the stock of
cash, and trade debtors less trade creditors, and other short-term liabilities (excluding short-term
debt).
dQ is defined in equation (4). V, is measured at the beginning of the period.289 Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow
group to another. As explained in the next section, we split the sample accord-
ing to the size of pKt _ 2 in order to minimize problems of endogenous selec-
tion in estimation.
8 The table indicates that investment and cash flow, each as
a percentage of the end-of-period capital stock, decrease with size. This is
particularly true of cash flow, with small firms generating a return of 18%
compared to only 11% for large firms. Ceteris paribus, the existence of higher
cash flows for small firms makes it less likely that they will face financial
constraints. The dividend payout ratio is higher for larger firms, although this
appears to be mainly due to the fact that depreciation (the difference between
cash flow and profit) represents a higher proportion of cash flow for large
firms; the average dividend-to-cash-flow ratio is remarkably constant across
the three size categories. The frequency with which dividends are paid in-
creases with size, but even for small firms, however, the average dividend
payout ratio is approximately 34% and dividends are paid 89% of the time.
Prima facie evidence that internal sources of finance are preferred to exter-
nal sources is represented by the fact that investment is financed mainly
through retentions, which constitute about 67% of the total sources of funds.
Perhaps it is a surprise that the proportion of funds raised from retentions by
large firms is almost identical to that raised by small firms. New equity varies
between 12% and 15% of total new funds.
9 The frequency of new share issues
increases with size. The lower frequency of new equity issues for small firms
is consistent with the observation that flotation and underwriting costs are a
decreasing function of the value of the issue.
Long-term debt represents a small percentage of investment finance, espe-
cially for smaller firms. This suggests that it is expensive for small firms to
rely on market debt. Note, however, that the percentage of new finance de-
rived from short-term debt (with maturity of less than one year) is greater for
smaller firms. The vast majority of their short-term debt is provided by banks.
This indicates that the difficulty of borrowing in the open market may be
partly relieved by the ability to borrow from institutions that can more easily
monitor the borrower through a continuing relationship. It is not clear, how-
ever, that the duration of bank debt matches the requirements imposed by
investment projects that will provide a return over a long period of time.
A final piece of interesting evidence from table 11.1 is that the standard
deviation of real sales growth falls with size, although this effect is not very
large. The slightly higher figure for small firms may be reflected in the rela-
tively high ratio of current assets to the capital stock, in that such firms may
find it useful to maintain a sizeable reserve of liquid assets in order to buffer
the volatility of sales revenues and to avoid being forced to borrow on un-
favorable terms. Moreover, this ratio is one of the indices commonly used by
lenders to judge the credit worthiness of potential borrowers. Another indica-
tor of the ability to meet financial obligations is the ratio between interest
payments and cash flow, which is smaller for smaller firms. By presenting a
healthy liquid asset position firms may be able to reduce the cost of bor-
rowing.290 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
Table 11.2 Evidence from CBI Industrial Trends Survey of
U.K. Manufacturing Companies
Size by Number of Employees (%)
Question Response
Inadequate net return on proposed
investment
Shortage of internal finance
Inability to raise external finance
Cost of finance
Uncertainty about demand
Shortage of labor (including man-


















































Note: This table reflects the average response to the question, "What factors are likely to limit
(wholly or partly) your capital expenditure authorizations over the next 12 months?" The question
was posed over the period 1981-86 in 24 quarterly surveys.
Table 11.2 presents some independent evidence on the degree to which fi-
nancial factors are perceived to influence the investment decision of different
sizes of firms. The figures are taken from the quarterly survey of U.K. manu-
facturing industry conducted by the Confederation of British Industry. It indi-
cates that over the period 1981-86, virtually a third of the respondents cited
some financial factor as constraining their investment (although it is hard to
distinguish the three questions related to financial factors). The most striking
feature of the table is, however, the proportion of the largest firms that cited
"shortage of internal finance" as a significant constraint on their investment.
While the sample of firms in this category is low,
1
0 this does suggest that very
large firms may face financial constraints. The table suggests, however, that
slightly less large firms (in the third category) face somewhat lower financial
constraints.
Another dimension that has a potential bearing on investment and financing
decisions, especially in the presence of asymmetric information, is the firm's
age. Although we do not have exact information on each firm's age, we do
know when firms went public. In table 11.3, we distinguish between obser-
vations on firms that have been quoted for at least 12 years and observations
on firms younger than 12 years. In this table we examine only small and
medium-size firms (i.e., pKt _ 2 less than £50 million). Since larger firms are
almost exclusively more than 12 years since their first quotation, they would
all fall into the "old" category. By concentrating on the remainder, we con-
sider firms which, apart from age, are more nearly alike.
Within this size category, new firms have a higher investment rate and cash
flow. The payout ratio is fairly stable across the two categories. New firms291 Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow
have a higher use of retentions and also derive a slightly larger fraction of new
funds from new share issues. The higher profitability and investment of the
new firms is reflected in a higher value of Q. There is little variation in the
standard deviation of sales growth, thus suggesting that sales volatility does
not depend to any great extent on firm age.
It was also suggested that the location of the agency cost function, and
hence the degree to which companies face financial constraints, depends on
the sector in which it is operating. We have therefore also considered the dif-
ference between companies in growing and declining sectors, this time con-
ditioning on size by splitting the sample according to whether/?#, _ 2 is greater
or less than £10 million. (The state of manufacturing industry in the United
Kingdom in the 1970s and early 1980s was such that a majority of our sample
of firms belonged to sectors that declined over the period considered.) As
might be expected, comparing firms of similar size, both investment and prof-
itability are, on average, higher for firms in growing sectors. Again, however,
the average dividend payout ratios are very similar across the different cate-
gories. Further, no clear pattern emerges concerning the use of different
sources of finance, although small firms in growing industries make less use
of retention finance (only 59% of total new funds).
Table 11.3 Split by Size and Age
Case 1 pK,_2 < £50m; less than 12 years since first quotation
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Change in short-term debt/total funds
Change in bank debt/total funds
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Average Q
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Notes: For information on variables, see table 11.1.292 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
11.6 Empirical Results
What does the empirical evidence say about the role of financial factors in
investment decisions for U.K. firms? We start our discussion from the results
obtained from estimating equation (3) for the entire sample. We wish to allow
for the possibility of time-specific (a,) and firm-specific (a.) effects. Introduc-








The stochastic term, vit, arises from disturbances to the adjustment cost
function, as in the standard Q model. There is nothing in the theory that re-
stricts this term to be an innovation error, and, indeed, related research esti-
mating the Q model on similar data has suggested that vit follows an AR(1)
process (Blundell et al. 1989). To allow for this possibility, lagged values of
the dependent variable and of each regressor are included in the equation (al-
though we estimate the model without imposing the common factor restric-
tion). The lagged values may, of course, also reflect the ambiguities involved
in choosing the timing of the various variables.
The model has been estimated in first differences to allow for firm-specific,
time-invariant effects and an instrumental variable procedure is used to allow
for the endogeneity of the regressors.
1
1 This endogeneity arises because cur-
rent cash flow, debt, current assets, Q, and investment may all be simulta-
neously determined (although Q, unlike the other variables, is constructed by
dating it at the beginning of the period). In addition, care must be taken to
allow for the possibility of measurement error, particularly in Q. Not only are
contemporaneous values of these variables invalid instruments, but first differ-
encing introduces the correlation between, for example, Qt _ , and vt _ , into
the equation. In the absence of serial correlation in vit, however, further lags
of each of the regressors are valid instruments. Thus, in the third period, var-
iables dated t = 1 may be used as instruments in the differenced equation (as
well as Qi2 if it is uncorrelated with vi2). Similarly, in the fourth period, vari-
ables dated t = 1 and t = 2 are valid instruments. Since this gives more
instruments in later periods, and since vit may be heteroscedastic across com-
panies, we use an application of Hansen's (1982) generalized method of mo-
ments estimator. However, computing restrictions force us to restrict the in-
strument set.
1
2 Below, we denote the instrument set used in the form Q(n,m),
where n indicates that the latest lag used is dated t — n, and m indicates the
number of lags used.
B
In column 1 of table 11.4 we present the estimated coefficients for the equa-
tion containing, in addition to Q and lagged investment, both flow and stock293 Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow
Table 11.4 The Full Sample
Period 1972-86
720 Companies, 6,546 observations



























































































Note: Time dummies are included in all equations. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity
across companies. The notation m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0,l) under the null of no serial correlation (see Arellano and Bond
1988). The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed
as x
2(k)- Here W is a Wald test of the joint significance of the time dummies, asymptotically
distributed as x
2(k), under the null of no significance. The instrument sets are explained in the
text.
measures of liquidity and the stock of debt.
1
4 Time dummies are included as
regressors and instruments in all equations. The results suggest that contem-
poraneous Q is a significant determinant of investment although, as in most
other empirical studies, the size of its coefficient is small. Cash flow, espe-
cially dated t — 1, plays an important role with large coefficients. The coeffi-
cient on contemporaneous debt is negative and significant, as one would ex-294 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
pect if an increase in cash flow decreases the marginal agency cost of debt, so
that AXBIX < 0 (see [5]). The stock of liquid assets does not play a significant
role in this equation. Dropping liquid assets from the model in column 1 has
very little effect on the other terms in the equation.
These results are generally robust to variations in the instrument set. The
equation does not exhibit second-order serial correlation (see the ml statistic),
which would invalidate the instrument set. Moreover, the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are not correlated with
the error term. If Qt _ , is included in the instrument set, the coefficient on
contemporaneous Q falls, which is consistent with the possibility that down-
ward bias due to measurement error in Q outweighs any upward bias due to
the possible endogeneity of Q.
15 This result is also found when the same com-
parison is made for the other equations presented below, and so we generally
exclude Qt _ , from the instrument set.
The positive effect of the lagged investment rate and the negative coefficient
on the lagged Q term are consistent with an AR(1) error term in the underlying
equation. However, the positive coefficients on both the cash flow terms is
inconsistent with this explanation of the dynamic structure. (Replacing
[X/pK]t with [XlpK\t _ 2 provides a result consistent with the AR[1] process,
although this would imply that lagged cash flow, not current cash flow, should
be in the specification in eq. [3].) This suggests that the timing of the impact
of cash flow in investment is more complex than suggested by the model in
Section 11.4. Intuitively, the significance of lagged cash flow may be ex-
plained if external investors may observe only cash flow in the previous period
or, more generally, may judge the firm's credit worthiness using a weighted
average of past cash flows.
16
In column 2 of table 11.4 we explore what happens when debt and liquid
assets are excluded from the model (debt is rarely significant in the subsam-
ples of the data examined below, mainly due to the fact that less data is avail-
able). The positive effect of contemporaneous cash flow disappears in the
absence of the negative effect of contemporaneous debt, while lagged cash
flow becomes more important. The coefficient on current Q falls slightly.
In column 3, current and lagged output, Y, as a proportion of the replace-
ment value of the capital stock are added to this specification (contempora-
neous output is not significant). Their coefficients are neither individually nor
jointly significant. However, note that the negative coefficient on current out-
put is consistent with the presence of imperfect competition, which introduces
an additional wedge between marginal and average Q, which depends on the
present value of current and future output.
1
7 The wedge captures the loss of
monopoly profits due to the decrease in price associated with the additional
output produced by new investment. Adding output to the equation to some
extent proxies for the wedge, and therefore we would expect a negative coef-
ficient.
18 We explore this issue further below for different subsamples of the
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The presence of output in the equation has little effect on the coefficient of
lagged cash flow. Its remaining significance suggests that even if cash flow is
to some extent proxy ing for demand, this is not the main reason for its impor-
tance. The principal model investigated below is a parsimonious version of
column 2 of table 11.4, dropping lagged Q and current cash flow (which are
individually and jointly insignificant). The size and significance of the other
variables are virtually unchanged when these two terms are omitted.
One reason for the significance of cash flow is that it may be a better proxy
for market fundamentals than the market value of the firm, and entrepreneurs
may respond only to fundamentals (Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers 1988). In
this case one would expect that during periods of potential speculative bubbles
or fads in the stock market, the coefficient for Q and cash flow should be
different, compared with other periods. In particular one may expect that Q
matters less relative to cash flow in such periods. It is obviously difficult to
identify unambiguously when bubbles or fads caused share prices to be a poor
reflection of fundamentals. During the years covered by our estimation, the
years between 1981 and 1986 are possible candidates; average price-earnings
ratios have been consistently higher from 1981 onward than over the previous
10 years. While this may, of course, simply reflect more optimistic expecta-
tions, this may also reflect the existence of a bubble.
We have therefore reestimated the specification used below, for example in
table 11.5, allowing all of the slope coefficients to differ between the two
subperiods. However, there is no strong evidence of a structural break. The
Wald test statistic for the joint significance of the three additional terms (each
variable interacted with a dummy equal to 1 for the period 1981-86 and 0
otherwise) is 6.83 (compared with a critical value of 7.81 at the 5% signifi-
cance level). In addition, the coefficient on lagged cash flow for the whole
period was 0.2951 (with standard error of 0.0462), while that for the addi-
tional variable lagged cash flow from 1981 to 1986 only was -0.0982 (with
standard error of 0.0607). If Qt _ , is included in the instrument set, the three
additional terms become jointly significant (with a Wald statistic of 15.3). The
same pattern arises for the cash-flow terms, and additionally in this case, the
coefficient on Q from 1981 to 1986 only is positive and significant. Any sup-
port for a structural break that might be found in these results would therefore
be in the opposite direction to what would be expected if cash flow were
merely proxy ing for market fundamentals. Rather, it seems that in the relative
boom years of the 1980s firms were simply less financially constrained and
hence cash flow was less important. The asymmetric effect of cash flow on
investment during booms and recessions is emphasised by Gertler and Hub-
bard (1988). Of course, it may be that cash flow proxies both for market fun-
damentals and financial constraints, but that the change in the latter dominates
in the 1980s. This is an issue that deserves further investigation. However,
these initial results suggest that fads and bubbles are not the key explanation
as to why cash flow is significantly related to investment.296 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
The arguments summarized in the previous section suggest that cash flow
and other financial variables may have a differential impact across different
types of firms. In table 11.5 we present the results on the effect of cash flow
for firms of three different sizes (small, medium, and large). We also consider
"very large" firms (which are a subset of the group of large firms). Note that
observations are classified according to the size of the capital stock at the end
of time t — 2, pKt _ 2. Under the assumption that the error term in the levels
equation is not serially correlated, pKt _ 2 is predetermined with respect to the
error term in the differenced equation. Current assets were not significant
when added to the various equations. In addition, current cash flow and fur-
ther lags of cash flow and Q were generally insignificant when added to the
equations presented.
Consider, first, cases 1,2, and 3 in table 11.5. The coefficient on cash flow
is significant for all classes of firms. Perhaps surprisingly, it is greater for large
firms, although there is not a statistically significant difference between the
coefficients for large and small firms at normal significance levels (the t-
statistic for the significance of the difference between the two coefficients is
1.13).
1
9 The coefficient and the significance of current Q increase across the
size categories; for small firms Q appears to have no impact on investment,
while for large firms the coefficient on Q is much greater. Given the increasing
coefficient on cash flow as size increases, we also consider whether the impact
of cash flow for large firms is dominated by very large firms. The results
shown in case 4 show that this may be the case; although the coefficient on
cash flow for very large firms is less precisely determined (due to fewer obser-
Table 11.5 Split by Size
Case 1 pK,_2< £6m
Case 2 £6w < pKt_2 < £50m
Case 3 pKt_2 > £50m
Case 4 pKt_2 > £100m
Dependent Variable A(//X"), Case 1
Number of firms 311
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vations) the significance of the difference between it and that for small firms
is slightly higher (with a ^-statistic of 1.50).
These qualitative results are invariant to alternative instrument sets. How-
ever, the significance of both the Q and cash flow does vary with the instru-
ment set. In particular, if Qt _ l is included in the instrument set, current Q is
statistically significant for medium, large, and very large firms although the
estimated coefficients are slightly lower. In addition, the differences between
the cash-flow coefficients are more significant (with f-statistics of 1.68 for the
difference between small and large firms and 1.88 for the difference between
small and very large firms).
With one main exception, adding other regressors has little impact on the
coefficients and standard errors presented in table 11.5. The exception occurs
when current output is added to the model for large firms. The coefficient on
current output for large firms is - 0.0106 with a standard error of 0.0026. Its
negative sign is again consistent with the possibility that output is reflecting
the existence of imperfect competition since large firms are more likely to be
in a position to exploit the benefits of monopolistic competition. The coeffi-
cient on current cash flow for large firms increases substantially when current
output is included, although it is less precisely estimated. Current debt also
has a negative sign but is not significant when added to the models in table
11.5. Adding debt tends to increase the difference in the coefficients on cash
flow between case 1 and case 3 firms, although their standard errors also in-
crease.
In the context of the model sketched in Section 11.4, the size of the coeffi-
cient on cash flow for large firms cannot be accounted for by a higher invest-
ment rate of large firms (see [5]), because it is, in fact, lower. It could be
explained by the lower cash flow/capital ratio that characterizes larger firms,
if the coefficient of cash flow decreases with this ratio. It is easy to find pa-
rameterizations of the agency cost function that yield this result.
2
0 This factor
may be dominant since differences in the investment rate are not very large
and neither is the difference in the riskiness as measured by the variance of
sales. It is also possible that the differential according to size may capture
industry effects. Finally, it is possible that, ceteris paribus, agency costs may
be more severe when insiders effectively controlling the firm hold a lower
fraction of the equity and/or outside equity holdings are more dispersed. Size
may proxy for the effect of these factors on the severity of the incentive prob-
lems.
Two criticisms might be made with regard to splitting firms according to
the replacement cost value of the capital stock two periods ago. One is that
there may remain some endogeneity introduced by serial correlation in the
error term (although we do not find such correlation). The second is that what-
ever effects size is proxying for, an alternative would be to split by the size of
a firm relative to the size of other firms in the industry in which that firm
operates. Thus a "small" firm overall may seem larger relative to other firms298 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
in its own industry. To meet these possible criticisms, we first split firms ac-
cording to their initial size (that is, their size when they first entered the data
base). Of course, this takes no account of the rate of growth of a firm since it
entered the data base, and, possibly as a result, there is much less variation in
the value of the cash-flow coefficient between different size classes of firms
measured by initial size. However, in table 11.6, we present the results of
splitting firms according to their initial size relative to that of other firms in
their industry that are also in the data base. Thus, case 1 firms are among the
smallest 75% of firms in their industry measured by initial size and case 2
firms are among the largest 25%. It is clear from the table that the results
concerning cash flow are similar to those in table 11.5 (indeed the size and
significance of the difference across the two categories is greater in table 11.6;
the ^-statistic on the difference between the two cash-flow coefficients is 1.84).
By contrast, however, Q appears more important for the smaller firms. This
latter result may be partly due to grouping together all "nonlarge" firms in the
first column.
While we do not have any data on ownership patterns, we can control for
industry. An interesting distinction, as suggested above, is between growing
and declining sectors. Table 11.7 contains the results of the size/sector split
(using only two categories for size). Due to the small number of observations
in some of the categories, parameters are estimated with less precision than in
other tables. The perhaps surprising result from table 11.7 is that the coeffi-
cient on cash flow is greater for firms operating in growing sectors. This is
true even if the long-run impact of cash flow is considered. This table also
mirrors the result that cash flow is more important for large firms, with the
largest coefficient being for large firms in growing sectors. This result is not
Table 11.6 Split by Initial Size Relative to Distribution of Industry Initial Size
Case 1 pK0 within smallest 75% of firms in the same industry
Case 2 pK0 within largest 25% of firms in the same industry
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Table 11.7 Split by Size and Sector
Case 1 pKt_2 < £10m; growing sectors
Case 2 pKt_2 < £\0m; declining sectors
Case 3 pKt_2 > £10m; growing sectors






























































Note: See notes to table 11.4. Growing sectors are chemicals and man-made fibers; electrical and
instrument engineering; and food, drink, and tobacco. Declining sectors are metals and metal
goods; other minerals and mineral products; mechanical engineering; motor vehicles, parts, and
other transport equipment; textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear; and other industries.
sensitive to the instrument set used. One explanation for this effect may be
that the lower investment rate of firms in declining sectors dominates empiri-
cally their lower cash flow and their higher agency costs, which, ceteris pari-
bus, would be expected to arise. The table indicates that the impact of Q is
mixed: among small firms it is more important for firms in declining sectors
but among large firms it is more important for firms in growing sectors.
The final issue we wish to explore is the effect of age on the relevance of
cash flow. In table 11.8 we report the results obtained when, excluding large
firms, we distinguish between firms that have been quoted for more or less
than 12 years. Twelve years may seem a rather long time, but it is imposed by
the necessity of having enough observations in the "new" firms category for
the purposes of estimation. The results suggest that cash flow is somewhat
more important for new firms, although the differences between the two cate-
gories are not large. Once again, it should be noted that the category of new
firms is very small, and that the variables consequently tend to be less signifi-
cant.
11.7 Conclusions
The results discussed in this paper suggest that, in all cases, cash flow is
significantly associated with investment. Stock measures of liquidity do not
play an important empirical role. The stock of debt does appear to have a300 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
Table 11.8 Split by Size and Age
Case 1 pK,_2 < £50m; less than 12 years since first quotation
Case 2 pKt_2 < £50m; more than 12 years since first quotation




































Note: See notes to table 11.4.
negative impact on investment, although the significance of this term depends
on the size of the sample. The performance of Q is mixed. While it plays a
significant role in the full sample, there are subsamples, typically of small
firms, in which it does not appear to have an independent effect on investment.
The results for the full sample over different time periods suggest that the
significance of cash flow is not due solely to the fact that, in proxying for
demand, it is a better measure of fundamentals than Q, nor simply that it
contains new information not captured by beginning-of-period Q, although
more research is needed on this issue.
Cash flow does appear to differ across firms in the magnitude of its impact
on investment. In particular, it appears to play a more important role for large
firms than for small firms. While this may be surprising at first sight, there are
several reasons why this effect might be observed. For example, it may reflect
the fact that large firms tend to have a lower relative cash flow. In addition, it
may reflect the possibility that large firms have a more diverse ownership
structure, which tends to increase agency costs. Given size, the effect of cash
flow tends to be larger for firms in growing sectors, contrary to what one
would expect since collateralizable net worth is likely to be larger in this case
and the risk of bankruptcy lower. However, firms in growing sectors need to
finance a higher rate of investment. Finally, when firms are classified accord-
ing to age, it appears that cash flow matters somewhat more for newer firms,
as would be expected since information asymmetries are likely to be larger for
such firms and they need to finance a higher investment rate.
Our results suggest that capital market imperfections should be an impor-301 Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow
tant ingredient of any extension to or reformulation of the adjustment cost
model of investment. However, the mixed performance of Q suggests that








where D} denotes dividends, Vf new shares issued, co;. the sample selection
premium, all in period j, and 7 = (1 - m)/(l - z)(l - c), with m denoting
the tax rate on dividends, z the tax rate on capital gains, and c the rate of
imputation. Here R is the market rate of return on equity, assumed to be con-
stant for simplicity.
The maximization is subject to the definition of sources and uses
(A2) (1 " T)/>?II(A:,,/,) - A{Xt,Bt,Lt,PtK) + Vf + Bt+i
+ L,[l + (1 - T)?-] = D, + PtIt + [1 + /(I - T)]B, + Lt+l,
where T is the corporate tax rate, p\ the price of output, pt the price of invest-
ment goods, p
yll(i) real revenues net of variable costs, Kt capital stock, A(t)
agency costs of debt, Bt debt, L, liquid assets, all in period t, i the rate of
interest on debt, and i
L the rate of interest on liquid assets. For ease of nota-
tion, we omit depreciation allowances; these are included, however, in the
empirical work. Cash flow, denoted Xt, is defined as
X, = (1 - T)II(t) - [1 + i(l - T)]5, + [1 + HI - T)]L,.
The capital accumulation equation is
(A3) K, = (1 -
and the nonnegativity conditions are Vf > 0 and D, > 0.
The first-order conditions are:
(A4) (7 + |xf)[(l - Ax[t])(l - T^n/O - pj + \f = 0,
(A5) (7 + M.?)[(l " Ax[r])(l - T^ryr) - PtAK(t)}










 + 1 ^> "
(1 + [1 - 7}f) +AL(t+l)] = 0.
Also:
(A9) Xf + (y + tf)[(l - Ax[r])(l + [1 - T]0 + AB(t)] = 0
(A10) \f + (7 + |xf)[(l - Ax[f])(l + [1 - T]P) + At(0] = 0.
X's denote the multipliers associated with the state variables and |xf and (xf
the multipliers associated with the nonnegativity condition for Dt and Vy.
Equations (A4) to (A 10), together with the complementary slackness condi-
tions, summarize the conditions for an optimum.
If we assume that the adjustment cost function is separable and has the form
equation (A4) yields (1) in the main text when Dt > 0 so that (xf = 0.
In order to obtain the relationship between the marginal and average value
of the capital stock, equation (2) in the main text, multiply (A4) by /,, (A5) by
Kt, (A6) by Vf, (A7) byBt+l, (A8) byL,+ l, (A9) by Bt, (A10) by £„ and add them together. Solve the resulting difference equation forward and note that
(A7) and (A9) imply that
Xf+1 = -(7 + |*f)[l + R/d ~ 2)],
and that (A8) and (A 10) imply that
M+i = (7 + MOT + */(l - z)].
This yields equation (2) in the main text.
Notes
1. However, the possibility of negative profit, combined with corporate tax asym-
metries, reduces the effective corporate tax rate because there may not exist taxable
profits against which to offset an interest payment. This reduces the tax advantage of
debt (see DeAngelo and Masulis 1980; Auerbach 1986; and Mayer 1986).
2. For example, typical transaction costs in raising £5 million would be around
£250,000, compared with only £500,000 for raising £50 million.
3. The existence of a high allowance for capital gains results in a zero marginal tax303 Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow
rate for investors earning less than about £6,000 per year in the form of capital gains.
One should, in addition, consider the possibility that firms may not be able to offset
their advance corporation tax against the mainstream corporation tax. This implies that
the effective rate of imputation is smaller than the statutory rate, making new share
issues less attractive (Keen and Schiantarelli 1988).
4. See also Steigum (1983) and Bernstein and Nadiri (1986) in which the cost of
borrowing is made an increasing function of the debt/equity ratio.
5. Edwards and Keen (1985) discuss what happens when dividends are tax favored
and a maximum limit is imposed on their distribution, as is the case in the United
Kingdom.
6. The LSPD data is needed to calculate Tobin's Q.
7. Further details are available from the authors on request.
8. Splitting by payout behavior is more open to criticism from this point of view.
In order to allow for any distortion to these results arising from measurement error
in K, a similar split was performed using the real value of sales two periods earlier as a
measure of size. The results were very similar.
9. Mayer (1987, 1988) claims that the proportion of funds raised from new share
issues is somewhat lower, although our figures are in line with official statistics (DTI
Business Monitor, MA3).
10. Between 25 and 60 out of a sample of around 1,250.
11. Related research (Blundell et al. 1989) has indicated that the presence of firm-
specific effects can lead to biased estimated coefficients when the model is estimated in
its levels form. In addition, the presence of the lagged dependent variable in the more
general equation makes the within-groups estimator inconsistent for dynamic models
with small T(Nickell 1981).
12. We have used GAUSS 1986, version 1.49B, in which the instrument set must
be restricted to 90 instruments. Thanks are due to Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond
for allowing the use of their GAUSS programs in this work.
13. For m = 1, the GMM instrument set differs from simply using Q,_n essentially
by allowing the reduced-form coefficient to vary over time.
14. We have experimented with alternative empirical measures for 7. The results
are very similar whatever measure is used. The results are also not sensitive to the
inclusion of the discount factor, R, in the definition of Qr In the tables we report the
results obtained when 7 and the discount factor are set equal to one.
15. In principle, including Qt _2 in the instrument set may also introduce measure-
ment error since it also appears as a regressor in the differenced equation, although
in later tables the first-differenced Qt _ l is omitted since it is not significant for sub-
samples of the data. This issue has been explored in detail by Blundell et al. (1989)
on the same data set, and our choice of instrument set is consistent with their re-
sults.
16. This would require the inclusion of Xt _ , and further lags in the agency cost
function described in Section 11.4.
17. More precisely, omitting debt, liquid assets, and taxes, it can be shown that
X5 =
where €, +,- is the elasticity of demand.
18. However, if the equation is estimated in a quasi-differenced form, as suggested
by Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) and Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1988), the
contemporaneous investment rate, given "scaled" past investment, should be positively304 Michael Devereux/Fabio Schiantarelli
related to (Y/K)l _ v When this variable is added to our specification alone, it is rarely
significant. This issue deserves additional investigation.
19. We need to test the hypothesis that the difference between the cash-flow coeffi-
cients equals zero. On the assumption that the error terms are independent across the
two categories, the appropriate standard error is simply the square root of the sum of
the squares of the two standard errors on the two coefficients. This allows a simple t-
test to be performed on the difference between the coefficients.
20. This would be the case, for example, if, ignoring liquid assets
A = {-a(X/K)
a + b{BIK)*)K,
where 0 < a < 1, or if
A = (X/K)
a(B/K)VK,
where a < 0.
21. For example, see Chirinko (1984) and Hayashi and Inoue (1988) for Q models
with multiple capital inputs, Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1988) for a Q model with im-
perfect competition and labor as a quasi-fixed factor, and Bond and Meghir (1989) for
an adjustment cost model that avoids the use of stock market values and parameteriza-
tion of the gross production function.
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